

CHAPTER
TWELVE



The Love-Hate Relationship:
Love and Hatred

I. The Love Imperative

One of the most well-known principles of religious thought is a verse that appears in *Parshat Kedoshim*: “Love your neighbor as yourself.”¹ The centrality of this ideal in Jewish theology, unmistakably evident in popular discussion, is expressed formally by R. Akiva, who stated simply, “This is a great principle in Torah.”² The *Sefer HaChinmukh*³ locates this “greatness” in the fact that many other principles of interpersonal relations derive from this one. Allowing a genuine love for one’s fellow to flourish will automatically lead to an attention to those other commandments that govern the interactions between people; thus, this commandment serves as the backbone of Jewish societal law.

1. *Leviticus* 19:18.

2. *Torat Kohanim* and *Talmud Yerushalmi, Nedarim* 9:5.

Recognizing this primacy, the famous kabbalist R. Yitzchak Ashkenazi (Arizal) recommended that prior to praying, one express the acceptance upon himself of particular attention to this commandment.⁴

This love is thus an actual biblical commandment and transcends the sense of affection that is often felt between two people on an instinctual level. R. Yitzchak Hutner⁵ writes that it is integral to the fulfillment of this precept that the feeling of love derive from the realization of the shared brotherhood of the Jewish people, rather than from an appreciation of any personal qualities.⁶ This is not meant to imply that humanity as a whole is outside the imperative of love; certainly one is obligated to cultivate a concerned sense of care and compassion toward all people.⁷ In fact, it may be with this in mind that Ben Azai responded to R. Akiva's famous comment with what he considered to be an even more encompassing verse, "This is the book of the descendants of Adam, on the day that God created man, He made them In the likeness of God,"⁸ whose subject is apparently all of humanity.⁹ However, the unique familial connection creates a special bond among Jews. So, too, this commandment gains strength as the kinship increases.¹⁰ In this sense, the Talmud¹¹ suggests that the same verse applies in a more intense manner when referring to one's wife.

3. *Mitzvah* 243.

4. See R. Yochanan Segal Vosner, *Responsa Chayyei HaLevi, Yoreh Deah* 74:14; R. Asher Anshel Katz, *Shemen Rosh*, vol. 2, p. 569; R. David Ariav, *L'Reakha Kamokha*, p. 181, *Nir L'David* 268; and R. Ovadiah Yosef, *Anaf Etz Avot to Pirkei Avot*, 5:17.

5. *Pachad Yitzchak* to *Pesach* 8:1 and 29:2.

6. On the connection between love and shared peoplehood, see also, in R. Avraham Bick, ed., *Ba'ayot Aktualiyot L'Ohr HaHalakhah*, R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin, pp. 79–80, and R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, pp. 126–127.

7. See the extensive discussion of this point in R. Shlomo Shneider, *Responsa Divrei Shlomo* 2:121.

8. *Genesis* 5:1.

9. See, for example, R. Shlomo Goren, in the journal *Ohr HaMizrach*, vol. 1 no. 1:10. See also R. Dov Rosenthal, *Divrei Yosher to Pirkei Avot*; R. Shmuel Yitzchak Hillman, *Ohr HaYashar, Parshat Kedoshim*; R. Uri Langer, *Ohr HaMitzvot* 206; and R. Shimshon Chaim Nachmeni, *Toldot Shimshon, Avot* 1:12.

10. See R. Yosef Patzanovsky, *Pardes Yosef, Leviticus* 19:17, as well as *Maharatz Chayes, Shabbat* 31a, in contrasting the views of R. Akiva and Ben Azai. See also *Anaf Etz Avot to Pirkei Avot*, 2:15.

11. *Kiddushin* 41a, *Niddah* 17a.

II. Understanding “*Kamokha*”

The term *kamokha*, “as yourself,” appears somewhat daunting; the investment one has in oneself is a powerful reality that is hard to parallel.¹² R. Shlomo Goren¹³ suggests that the reference is to a specific category of love, as distinct from the usage of that word in other contexts. The love for God is one that requires a complete submission to Him; His needs are paramount and above any human affections. The love for God is thus certainly not as that for oneself but as that for greater than oneself. In contrast, when one expresses love toward, for example, an object or a food, he refers not to a bond of identity with that thing, but rather is stating that that object fulfills one’s needs and is in fact subservient to the one who loves. The love for fellow Jews, then, is thus differentiated from both of these in that it is a love in which neither party is in a context of service to the other or exalted beyond the other but, rather, each loves the other on the level that one does oneself. Another homiletic suggestion is that just as one manages to love oneself, despite one’s flaws and shortcomings, so too the perceived deficiencies of another do not justify withholding love from him.¹⁴

In addition to the challenge of “*kamokha*,” many find it difficult to know how to react to a commandment that seems to address itself to an emotion, demanding “love” toward another. In reality, though, this commandment is interpreted on a level that is more outwardly demonstrable. The Talmud¹⁵ renders it into Aramaic as *mah d’alakh sni l’chavr’kha lo ta’avid*—“That which is hateful to you, do not do to others.” Thus, many understand the commandment in this manner, as focused on refraining from negative behavior toward another.¹⁶ As the

12. See, among others, R. David Shlomo of Sraka, *Arvei Nachal*, and R. Yuval Yosef Ordentlich, *P’minei Nefesh*, to *Leviticus*.

13. In *Ohr HaMizrach*, *ibid*. See also R. Yosef Aryeh Petrover, *Divrei Yosef* to *Leviticus*.

14. Cited by R. Yosef Schwartz, in his *Misped V’Kinah* (printed in the back of the bound editions of the journal *VaY’lakket Yosef*, vol. 9).

15. *Shabbat* 31a. See also *Bereishit Rabbah*, 24:7.

16. See *Chiddushei Maharsha* and *Maharatz Chayes* to *Shabbat*; note the translation of R. Yonatan b. Uziel. See also R. Zalman Sorotzkin, *Oznayim LaTorah* to *Leviticus*, who suggests this issue is behind the difference between R. Akiva and Ben Azai. Note also *Pri Megadim*, *Eishel Avraham*, *Orach Chaim* 156, and R. Raphael Silber, *Marpei L’Nefesh* 2:44:2.

Ramban¹⁷ explains, it is problematic to obligate a person to attend to the needs of others on a level equal to the attention he gives to his own needs, or “as himself.” A similar comment is made by *Tosafot*.¹⁸ Beyond the practical challenge of such absolute magnanimity, the Talmud¹⁹ has explicitly recognized that a person must give precedence to his own vital necessities, as is stated “your life comes first.”

Another reason it might be assumed that the commandment is focused on avoiding the negative is suggested by R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel.²⁰ Were a person to limit his service to others to that which he wishes for himself, it is possible that severe discrepancies could exist between an individual and other members of society, sharply curtailing his sense of communal responsibility. Therefore, the Torah left it for other *mitzvot* to describe the parameters of such service, while this verse focuses on restricting harmful activity.²¹ R. Joseph D. Epstein²² suggests that even the previously cited authorities would agree that this imperative demands active behavior as well; however, the commandment is only

17. Commentary to *Leviticus*.

18. *Sanhedrin* 45a, s.v. *Bror*. The Talmud, referring to an individual being executed, notes that it must be carried out in a humane manner because of “Love your neighbor as yourself” (see also *Ketubot* 37b). In this context, *Tosafot* explain that the needs of a living person cannot possibly be taken as equal to one’s own; thus, when the Talmud mentions this commandment in an active sense, it is specifically in dealing with the needs of one no longer living.

19. *Bava Metzia* 62a. The context is a discussion of two individuals stranded in a desert, while one of them has a quantity of water sufficient to sustain only himself; thus, Ben P’tura and R. Akiva disagree as to whether or not the one with the water is obligated to give all or part of it to the other. R. Akiva, whose opinion is authoritative, rules that the water should be kept by the owner, for while he must be concerned for the life of the other, “his life comes first.”

20. *L’Nevukhei HaTekufah, Sha’ar* 2:32. See also R. Meir Leibush Malbim, *HaTorah V’HaMitzvah*, and R. Ya’akov Kaminetsky, *Emet L’Ya’akov*, to *Parshat Kedoshim*.

21. However, such a limitation might then be present in regards to negative behavior as well; in fact, the Rash and the Ra’avad, early commentators to the *Torat Kohanim*, understand this to be the reason for Ben Azai’s preference of the verse “This is the book of the descendants of Adam . . .” See also *Da’at Z’kenim L’Ba’alei HaTosafot* to *Parshat Kedoshim*. Note also R. J. David Bleich’s comments further on. For other interpretations of the differences between Ben Azai and R. Akiva, see R. Avraham Gumbiner, *Zayit Ra’anan* to *Torat Kohanim*, and *Sefer HaRa’avan* 37. See, at length, R. Natan Gestetner, *L’Horot Natan* to *Leviticus*.

22. *Mitzvot HaMussar*, pp. 211–214.

demonstrably transgressed when a person allows harm to befall his fellow. In this spirit, R. Meir Halevi²³ and R. Shlomo Luria²⁴ attributed to this verse the injunction against damaging another's property.²⁵ Within this general understanding, performing any act that one would not wish upon oneself places one in defiance of this commandment.²⁶ Contemporary authors have included examples such as eavesdropping in this category.²⁷ R. Natan Gestetner²⁸ rules that every moment behavior in violation of this commandment is continued, an additional violation is incurred²⁹. However, there is some discussion as to whether one violates this commandment if the behavior is motivated by innocent, non-malicious concerns.³⁰

Another possibility existing among commentaries may be that the commandment contains two branches: one, a prohibitive function, as described above, as well as an active element, that commands an emotional "love," but does not necessarily obligate behavior.³¹ Yet another possibility, consistent with the words of the Ramban, would assert that

23. *Yad Ramah, Bava Batra* 2:107.

24. *Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kamma* 10:23.

25. Interestingly, while the Torah clearly establishes the rules for remuneration of property damages, the precise source prohibiting the infliction of these damages is less obvious. R. Meir Auerbach, *Imrei Binah, Choshen Mishpat, Hilkhos Eidut* 33, discusses this verse as a possibility. See also Rabbeinu Yonah's commentary to *Pirkei Avot* 1:1, s.v. *Moshe*; Rabeinu Asher, *Responsa HaRosh, Klal* 108:10; R. Elijah of Vilna, *Biur HaGra, Choshen Mishpat* 155:8; R. Shmuel Strashoun, *Chiddushei Rashash, Ketubot* 18; R. Yoav Yehoshua Weingarten, *Chelkat Yoav, Choshen Mishpat* 20; R. Yisrael Ya'akov Kanievsky, *Kehilot Ya'akov, Bava Kamma* 1; R. Moshe Sofer, *Responsa Chatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah* 241; R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz, *Birkat Shmuel, Bava Kamma* 2; R. Aryeh Zev Gurwicz, *Rashei She'arim to Bava Kamma* 1; R. Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook, *Responsa Orach Mishpat, Choshen Mishpat* 26; and R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik in the journal *Mesorah*, 7:56.

26. See, however, *Orach Mishpat*, *ibid.*

27. See R. Aharon Grossman, *Responsa V'Darasha V'Chakartav*, 1, *Yoreh Deah*, 46.

28. *Responsa L'Horot Natan* 4:129. See also his commentary to *Pirkei Avot* 1:9, where other practical applications of this commandment in the monetary arena are discussed. Note also *Orach Mishpat*, *ibid.*

29. See also the discussion of R. David Ariav, the journal *Torat HaAdam L'Adam*, vol. 4, pp. 101-4.

30. See R. Uri Jungreis, in the journal *Torat HaAdam L'Adam*, vol. 4, pp. 118-32.

31. This view may be associated with the *Yereim* (*Sefer Yereim HaShalem*, 224) and the *Chinnukh* (see note 34).

the commandment addresses itself to an attitude of generosity toward another, concerning oneself with another's welfare with the same care one has for one's own (rather than obligating one to actually provide that welfare to the same degree as he acquires his own).³²

To the Rambam, however, this imperative apparently takes on a more active nature. In his *Mishneh Torah*³³ he codifies this commandment as requiring "that each person love every individual of Israel as himself, as it says, 'love your neighbor as yourself'; therefore, he must speak his praise, and worry about his money as he worries about his own and wishes for his own honor."³⁴ In his *Sefer HaMitzvot*,³⁵ he adds that as an aspect of this love, "and whatever will be in his control, if he wants it for himself, I want it also; and whatever I want for myself, I want³⁶ for him as well."³⁷ In addition, the Rambam also traces to this imperative a biblical commandment to engage in acts of loving kindness.³⁸ However, he considers the specific examples that he lists, visiting the sick, comforting mourners, and so forth, to be rabbinic incarnations.

As noted, though, adopting an affirmative commandment in this instance is difficult due to the seemingly unattainable nature of

32. See the analysis of the Rambam's position by R. Yechiel Neuman, in the journal *Torat HaAdam L'Adam*, vol. 4, pp. 79–80. Note also the words of the *Divrei Chaim*, R. Chaim Sanzer, cited by R. Naftali Halberstam, in the journal *Ohr Yisrael* (1:3 p. 188–189), and note as well the author's expansions and supports of the cited comments.

33. *Hilkhot Deiot* 6:3. See also *Targum Onkelos to Leviticus*, and R. Eliyahu of Vilna, *Biur HaGra to Torat Kohanim*.

34. It is noteworthy that the *Sefer HaChinnukh* (prohibition 219) combines a language similar to that of the Rambam with the phraseology of the Talmud in *Shabbat* ("that which is hateful to you . . ."). Note also *Sefer Mitzvot Katan* 8. See R. Ezriel Ciment, *Mitzvot HaMelekh*, positive commandment 8. See also R. Neuman, in the above cited article, pp. 89–90.

35. Positive commandment 206.

36. R. Chaim Heller, in his edition of *Sefer HaMitzvot*, also includes "and whatever I hate for myself, or for one close to me, I will hate for him as well."

37. The *Chizkuni*, in his commentary, appears to adopt a position similar to that of the Rambam. However, as R. Moshe Miernik (in the journal *Torat HaAdam L'Adam*, vol. 4, p. 63) observes, the language allows for a slight differentiation: the Rambam commands love, and the behavior emanates from that emotion; the *Chizkuni* understands the behavior to be the actual interpretation of the commandment.

38. *Hilkhot Aveil* 14:1.

“*kamokha*,” making the Rambam’s position surprising. The Netziv,³⁹ sensitive to this, suggests that the Rambam does not mean to obligate one to do for another as he would do for himself; rather one should do for another as one would want that other to do for them. R. Yisrael Meir Lau,⁴⁰ combining the Rambam’s words about acts of kindness with the Netziv’s suggestion, posits that the affirmative requirements of this commandment are all rabbinical in obligation, and, because of the rule of “your life comes first,” the rabbis were limited to a formulation like that of the Netziv.

Some contemporary authors⁴¹ suggest that perhaps the Rambam perceives a two-tiered commandment. One element, the prohibitive one, is absolute and mandatory. The second, the active component, is voluntary in nature. Known in halachic terminology as a *mitzvah kiyumit* (as contrasted with a *mitzvah chiyuvit*), this category would indicate that behavior in this area is a fulfillment of the goal of the commandment, without being mandatory in nature. (In other words, declining to behave in this manner would not incur any guilt or implications of negligence.) As is noted by proponents of this theory, adopting such an interpretation of the Rambam’s position would leave the practical difference between his opinion and that of other authorities very narrow, if at all existent.⁴²

R. J. David Bleich⁴³ explains that the comments in *Mishneh Torah* and those in *Sefer HaMitzvot* are to be taken as a sort of progression. In its essence, the imperative of loving one’s neighbor is centered on treating another as one would oneself, as he writes in *Mishneh Torah*. However, that has some limitations, in that one may not wish for oneself, were one in a comparable situation, that which one’s friend feels he currently needs. Therefore, he adds in *Sefer HaMitzvot* that it is incumbent on the

39. *Ha’amek Davar* to *Leviticus*.

40. *Responsa Yachel Yisrael* 3:31.

41. See, in the journal *Torat HaAdam L’Adam*, vol. 4, R. Moshe Miernik (pp. 60–77), and R. David Ariav (pp. 96–98), who adduces evidence from the writings and citations of the Chazon Ish, R. Yehoshua Leib Diskin, and R. Chaim Kanievsky.

42. See, however, R. Miernik’s qualification in footnote 10 of his article.

43. In *Y’kara D’Chaim* (memorial volume for R. Chaim Ya’akov Goldvicht), pp. 85–89.

individual to strive to develop this sensitivity to another's concerns, so that they become identical with his own, at which point they will become a part of the central obligation of love. However, as this may not automatically be the case, the Rabbis found it necessary to specifically command visiting the sick, comforting mourners, and the like, in the event that a person may feel that were he sick or bereaved, he would not want visitors. If this individual has not yet developed the complete sense of mutual identification, his sense of love will not yet motivate him to take up these activities; thus, a rabbinic command is needed.⁴⁴

R. Eliyahu Bakshi Doron⁴⁵ uses this concept of an ongoing development within this commandment to explain the Rambam's comment that one must express one's love to the other by "speaking his praise."⁴⁶ The Torah commands love not just in relation to one's fellow but also toward God. In delineating this commandment,⁴⁷ the Rambam writes that the development of that love comes through the study of, and the involvement in, His Torah and His creations. By focusing on the Divine majesty, one nourishes one's love for God. So, too, speaking the praises of one's fellow man will foster a sense of brotherly respect and love.⁴⁸

R. Sh'ar Yashuv Cohen⁴⁹ focuses on this comparison as well and suggests that both commandments of love are representative of the principle that often the Torah directs a *mitzvah* at the emotions by working through actions.⁵⁰ It is indeed true that one cannot be ordered how to feel; thus, all such imperatives that have such aspirations are centered on performable actions, as a means to an end. In this spirit is the comment

44. See also R. Moshe Shternbuch, *Moadim U'Zmanim* 5:346, and R. Yitzchak Shmuel Schechter, *Responsa Yashiv Yitzchak*, 3:31.

45. *Responsa Binyan Av* 3:78, and in the journal *Torah SheB'Al Peh* 36:33–40.

46. See also, on this point, R. Boruch D. Povarsky, *Bad Kodesh al HaTorah*, vol. 2, pp. 71–73.

47. *Sefer HaMitzvot*, positive commandment 3.

48. R. Shraga Feivel Shneebalg, *Responsa Shraga HaMeir* 1:1, discusses this at length. This idea need not be viewed as differing from R. Hutner's aforementioned words that the love must be due to shared peoplehood; rather, one refers to the motivation for love, the other to the process of developing it.

49. In *Torah SheB'Al Peh* 36:45–57.

50. This is a recurring theme in the halakhic thought of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik; see chapter 7, footnote 74, p. 112, note 80.

of the *Derekh Eretz Zuta*: “If you wish to attach yourself to love of your fellow, you should [involve yourself in actions that are] in his benefit.”⁵¹

Thus, the imperative of love demands that, at a minimum, one be protective of another to the extent that one is of oneself, if not actually requiring that one foster another with the same level of active attention, a position also with substantial support. R. Ya’akov Tzvi Mecklenberg⁵² lists a number of practical manifestations, some of which are explicitly included in other commandments, and others whose primary home is this verse.⁵³ Among these are displaying genuine affection; giving respectful treatment; seeking other’s best interests; feeling sincere empathy; showing expressions of friendship and joy in greeting one another; giving the benefit of the doubt;⁵⁴ providing financial, physical, and practical assistance; and taking care not to express, or to feel, condescension.

R. David Cohen,⁵⁵ in his discussion of obligations emanating from this commandment, offers another suggestion as to why R. Akiva terms the imperative “a great principle in Torah.” He notes a fundamental distinction between interpersonal commandments and those that are between Man and G-d. The latter category tends toward absolute rules, while interpersonal laws are often situational and those given to exceptions. The reason for this is that the “principle” of “Love your neighbor as yourself” stands as an overarching concept, rather than a specific law, and exists to provide a goal point that will affect the ultimate application of all the laws that relate to it.

III. The Sin of Hatred

Paralleling this commandment, actually one verse earlier, is its negative correlate, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart.”⁵⁶ The param-

51. See also *Orchot Tzaddikim*, *Sha’ar HaAhavah*, and R. Chaim Shmuelevitz, *Sichot Mussar*.

52. *HaK’tav V’HaKabballah* to *Leviticus*.

53. See also R. Shaul Wagshal, *Orchot Yesharim* 11.

54. Note also the implication of R. Eliezer of Metz, *Sefer Yereim* 39; *Yesod V’Shoresh HaAvodah*, *Sha’ar Avodat HaLev*, ch. 8; and R. Moshe Yechiel Elimelekh of Libertov, *VaYomer Moshe*, *Parshat Kedoshim*.

55. *Birkat Yaavetz*, vol. 1, pp. 45–52.

56. *Leviticus* 19:17.

eters of this prohibition, particularly in relation to the positive commandment, are a matter of some discussion.⁵⁷

The Rambam⁵⁸ interprets the verse in a manner specific to its words. That is to say, the prohibition is geared toward hatred that is hidden “within the heart,” as implied in the Talmud;⁵⁹ overt acts of distaste are considered to be violations of “love your neighbor.”⁶⁰ In this spirit, the Rambam elsewhere recommends that someone who finds himself to be harboring a dislike for another should discuss his feelings with that person and attempt to come to a reconciliation,⁶¹ so, too, the *Chizkum*⁶² considers this to be an integral part of this prohibition. According to the Ramban, however, at least in one of two positions that he quotes, and others,⁶³ any type of hatred violates this prohibition.

The word “hatred” itself is a somewhat vague, and usually emotionally charged, term. R. Chaim b. Attar⁶⁴ understands it as a “distancing in the heart” and claims that any degree of such separation is a violation of the prohibition. R. Yaakov Etlinger⁶⁵ describes a “hatred of the heart” as a controlled reaction to a negative stimulus, which can equally be controlled to remove from the heart, as per the commandment. This is distinct from a “hatred of the soul,” which is instinctual.⁶⁶

The Talmud⁶⁷ states that it is possible to violate this prohibition by means of a vow. According to most commentators,⁶⁸ this refers to the

57. See R. Yosef Engel, *Gilyonei HaShas, Kiddushin* 41a.

58. *Sefer HaMitzvot*, prohibition 302.

59. See *Arakhin* 16b, as well as *Torat Kohanim to Kedoshim* 4.

60. See *Targum* of R. Yonatan b. Uziel and *Sefer Mitzvot Katan* 17. Note R. Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin, *Harchev Davar to Deuteronomy* 22:3. See R. Raphael Yosef Chazan, *Responsa Chikrei Lev, Yoreh Deah* 80.

61. *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhhot Deiot* 6:6. See also commentary of R. Shimshon Raphael Hirsch to the Torah, and R. Menachem Krakowski, *Avodat Melekh to Hilkhhot Deiot*.

62. Commentary to *Leviticus*.

63. See, for example, *Sheiltot D’Rav Achai Gaon* 33.

64. *Ohr HaChaim* to *Leviticus*.

65. *Responsa Binyan Tziyyon HaChadashot* 75.

66. See also R. Yitzchak Isaac Hertzog, *Responsa Heikhal Yitzchak* 2. All of these manners of hatred are related in *Mitzvot HaShalom*, pp. 70–81.

67. *Nedarim* 65b.

68. Such as the Ritva, the Meiri, and the *Nimmukei Yosef*.

standard vow forbidding another from benefiting from the one taking the vow. The Rosh understands this vow to be one against greeting the other;⁶⁹ possibly, this is based on the statement of the Talmud elsewhere⁷⁰ that a “hater” is one who, out of animosity, does not converse with the other for a three-day period. It is possible that these positions may indicate somewhat the type of activities forbidden by this injunction.⁷¹ However, it should be noted that the vow itself may be incidental to the prohibition; Rashi⁷² implies that the vow is a result of violating this injunction, while the Ritva writes that the vow, if kept, will lead to its transgression.

R. Yisrael Meir Kagan⁷³ points out that this prohibition does not cease if one merely stops hating the other. Just as a person who steals must return the stolen property in order to undo the damage he has caused, so, too, a person who has hated another must take active steps to remove the hatred from his heart and prevent its recurrence.

The context of this prohibition is that of the commandment to provide effective rebuke to one who has sinned on some level. Thus, it might be suggested that this factor is contributory to determining the prohibition; in fact, Rashi understands the intent of the verse to be warning against hatred shown during the course of rebuke.⁷⁴ Some commentaries⁷⁵ understand the implication to be that when one person has wronged someone else, the victim should bring the matter to his attention rather than nursing a hatred against the offender. Others⁷⁶

69. See also *Responsa Orach Mishpat, Choshen Mishpat* 26, at length.

70. *Sanhedrin* 27a. See also *Responsa Maharil Diskin, K'tavim* 20.

71. As R. Dov Menashe Septimus (quoted in *V'Im Tomar* 3:1103) observes, this may challenge the Rambam's position somewhat.

72. This commentary was actually not written by Rashi himself.

73. *Ahavat Chesed*, ch. 4. R. Kagan discusses this *mitzvah* throughout this work, as well in his *Chafetz Chaim, Petichah*, and *Hilkhos Lashon Hara* 4:3, and in his *Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chaim* 156.

74. See a discussion of his and other positions in R. Yisrael Ya'akov Kanievsky, *Kehilot Ya'akov to Makkot* 16 (in older editions).

75. Such as the Chizkuni mentioned earlier, in line with the Rambam in *Hilkhos Deior*; see also Ramban and Rashbam.

76. See, for example, commentaries of *Pa'aneach Raza* and the *Tur* to the Torah.

understand the context to be that of a person deserving of rebuke for a sin against God, while some apply the verse to either instance.⁷⁷

IV. Permissible Hatred?

The interplay between rebuke and the prohibition of hatred is a complicated one, and thus so is the relationship of the latter prohibition, as well as the commandment of love, with an individual who has sinned to the extent he has earned the label “wicked” (*rasha*). This is further complicated by the usage of the words “your brother” and “your fellow” in the relevant verses, terminology that has at times been interpreted as exclusive of those whose behavior has, possibly, created a degree of spiritual alienation.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, many authorities⁷⁹ assumed that these commandments are in full effect even when dealing with a *rasha*, based on strong talmudic indications. However, there exists as well substantial opinion that a *rasha* is excluded from these *mitzvot*, and this has significant textual support as well.⁸⁰ Further, some sources indicate that not only may a *rasha* be hated, but that this is appropriate.⁸¹

Many authorities suggest that a reconciliation can exist between these positions and the relevant sources, talmudic and otherwise.⁸² The First Lubavitcher Rebbe, R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi,⁸³ rules in an apparently paradoxical manner that a person can only hate someone

77. See R. Yosef B'khor Shor, and *Sefer Yereim* 195.

78. For essays on this topic, see, for example, R. Ephraim Greenblatt, *Responsa Riv'vot Ephraim* 2:198:1; R. David Ariav, *L'Reakha Kamokha*; and R. Joseph D. Epstein, *Mitzvot HaShalom*.

79. See, for example, *Avot D'R'Natan*, ch. 16; *Yad Ramah, Sanhedrin* 52a; *Chiddushei Maharsha, Sanhedrin* 59a; *Tosafot, Pesachim* 113a; *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotzeach* 13:14.

80. See *Tosafot, Bava Metzvia* 32b; *Sefer HaChinnukh* 80; *Hagahot Maimoniyot, Hilkhot Deiot*, ch. 6; Rama, *Choshen Mishpat* 272, and *Siftei Kohen, Sefer Meirat Einayim*, and *Biur HaGra*; and *Hagahot Mishneh L'Melekh*. See also R. Yosef Hochgelerntner, *Mishnat Chakhamim*, prohibition 5; *Responsa Shraga HaMeir* 6:12:1; and R. Moshe Ariel Weinberg, *Dibrot Ariel to Arakhin* 3. Note the limitations found in R. Moshe Feinstein, *Dibrot Moshe, Bava Metzvia, Ha'arah* 77.

81. See *Pesachim* 113b (and note *Gilyonei HaShas*) and *Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim* 156. Note the interpretation of R. Elchanan Wasserman, *Kovetz He'arot* 655 (70 in other editions).

82. See also R. Moshe Troyesh, *Orach Meicharim* 3:1.

83. *Tania*, ch. 32. See also R. Chaim Shmulevitz, *Sichot Mussar*.

whom he is close to, and who is beloved to him. However, a person who is estranged will only be pushed further, and thus must not be hated; the hatred must be limited to those who are loved. The blatant contradiction of love and hate within one person requires explanation. R. Aryeh Leib Heller,⁸⁴ in a different context, observes that while goodness is a fundamental element of a person, sin never is; rather, it is a foreign element, introduced into the soul temporarily. Thus, the individual himself must always be loved; hatred is only allowed toward the sinful intrusion, an external aspect distinct from the person himself. Far from a mere homiletic device, this position is evident in the words of the Abarbanel and is held in practice by such later authorities as R. Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook,⁸⁵ R. Avraham Grodzenski,⁸⁶ R. Eliyahu Bakshi Doron,⁸⁷ R. Shlomo Wahrman,⁸⁸ R. Yehudah Gershuni,⁸⁹ R. Aharon Soloveichik,⁹⁰ and others.⁹¹

This approach may explain a comment of *Tosafot*⁹² that appears to support hatred of a *rasha*. The Talmud is discussing the *mitzvah* of *te'ihinah u'prikah*, assisting a struggling individual with the loading and unloading of packages. Surprisingly, precedence is given in this area to a "hated" individual, rather than to a friend, in order to help subjugate this deleterious instinct toward hatred.⁹³ *Tosafot* question how a hated person

84. Introduction to *Shev Shmat'ra*.

85. Quoted by R. Shlomo Goren in *Ohr HaMizrach* 1:1 and R. Yisrael Schepansky in *Ohr HaMizrach*, vol. 51, pp. 173–176.

86. *Torat Avraham*, pp. 156–157.

87. *Responsa Binyan Av*, *ibid*.

88. In the journal *HaDaron* 63:78 82, and in *Orot HaShabbat* 13.

89. In *Kol Tzofayikh*, pp. 327–329.

90. *Parach Matteh Aharon, Madda*, p. 78.

91. See, for example, R. Asher Anshel Katz, *U'LAsher Amar* to *Leviticus*; R. Shimon Gable, *Sofrei Shimon* to *Berakhot* 31a; and R. Moshe Aharon Teichman, in *Har HaMelekh*, vol. 6, *Hilkhot Deiot* 6:3, pp. 157–168, at length. Note also the discussion of R. Norman Lamm, *Halakhot V'Halikhot*, pp. 149–159. See also R. Simchah Rabinowitz, *Piskei Teshuvot*, vol. 6, ch. 156, p. 320–321.

92. *Pesachim* 113b, s.v. *Shera'ah*. See R. Shammai Kehat Gross, *Responsa Shevet HaKehati* 3:86, and R. Moshe Gross, *Nesiat Kapayim K'Hilkhata*, pp. 142–144.

93. See also the comment of Meiri, *Yoma* 75a: "One should never allow his hatred to restrain him from benefiting his fellow in any manner that he can benefit him."

can exist, in light of the prohibitions against such attitude,⁹⁴ and suggest that the subject is a sinner who should be hated.⁹⁵ If that is the case, and the hatred is appropriate, then the question becomes why the Talmud would recommend a method to minimize it. The answer given is that hatred has a tendency to grow and, if it is not quelled, may develop into a *simah gemurah*, an “absolute hatred.”⁹⁶ The difference between “hatred” and “absolute hatred” seems somewhat undefined. Based on this theory, some of its proponents suggest that the initial hatred, that which is permissible, refers to the isolated loathing of sin in and of itself. “Absolute hatred,” however, is directed at the person himself, and this, apparently, is always unacceptable.⁹⁷

Further, even if one does not accept this theory, the possibility of hating a *rasha* is most likely of extremely limited relevance. In order to attain the status of “wicked,” one must reject rebuke.⁹⁸ The offering of

94. It is also possible that the meaning is “one who hates” rather than “is hated”; see R. Baruch Epstein, *Torah Temimah*, Exodus 23:37, and R. Yaakov Moshe Feldman, *Meshivat Nefesh*.

95. In contrast to the position of *Tosafot* to *Bava Metzia*, 32b, s.v. *Lakhof*.

96. See, however, R. Moshe Sofer, *Torat Moshe, Parshat Mishpatim*. See also the discussion of R. Avraham Weinfeld in the journal *Chakhmei Lev*, vol 5, p. 71–74.

97. See also a different interpretation in R. David Cohen, *Birkat Yaavetz*, vol. 2, pp. 47–50.

98. See *Sefer HaMitzvot Katan* 17; *Responsa Maharam Lublin* 13; R. Ephraim Eredit, *Matteh Ephraim to Mishneh Torah*; R. Amram Blum, *Responsa Beit She'arim, Orach Chaim* 69 (see, however, R. Yosef Schwartz, *Responsa Ginzei Yosef* 107:4; his interpretation, though, seems difficult in the language of the Talmud and is without support from any other authorities); R. Shlomo HaKohen of Vilna, *Responsa Binyan Shlomo, Choshen Mishpat* 63; and, in the journal *Techumin*, R. Avraham Sherman (1:311) and R. Avraham Wasserman (21 pp 180–188).

99. *Arakhin* 16b. Proper application of rebuke is extremely complex and beyond the scope of this discussion, see also *Nimmukei Yosef, Yevamot* 65b; *Sefer Yereim* 37; R. Moshe of Coucy, *Sefer Mitzvot Gadol*, positive commandment 11; *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhhot Deiot* 6:7, and *Derekh HaMelekh*; R. Avraham Tzvi Eisenstadt, *Pitchei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah* 157:5; R. Yosef Babad, *Minchat Chinnukh* 239; R. Moshe Shick, *Responsa Maharam Shick, Orach Chaim* 303; R. Avraham Bornstein, *Responsa Avnei Nezer, Yoreh Deah* 461:15; R. Shalom Mordechai Schwadron, *Responsa Maharsham* 6:48; R. Yoel Teitelbaum, *Responsa Divrei Yoel* in several places; R. Shimon Krasner, *Nachalat Shimon to 1 Samuel* 1:5; R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, in the journal *Mesorah* 8:55; R. Shimon Greenfeld, *Responsa Maharshag* 1:43 and 2:125; R. Avraham ben Mordechai, *Responsa Ginmat Veradim, Orach Chaim, Klal* 3; R. Tzvi Ungstein in *Responsa Mekadd'shei Hashem* 2:79 and

rebuke in a proper manner is an extremely difficult and sensitive task, requiring a skill the Talmud indicates cannot be found in modern times.⁹⁹ Thus, for all practical purposes, the concept of *rasha* may be an irrelevant one. As such, many of this century's greatest authorities have ruled that the status is indeed inapplicable.¹⁰⁰ R. Meir Simchah of Dvinsk¹⁰¹ offers perhaps the most far reaching version of this theory, suggesting that the last time it was possible to hate a *rasha* was back in the desert, before the sin of the golden calf. Since then, no Jew is on secure enough moral footing to hate another for his spiritual or ethical failings.

Thus, it seems that very little room is left in this day and age for any hatred whatsoever of one's fellow Jew. Rather, the twin commandments mandating love and forbidding hatred combine to engender within the halakhically sensitive soul a genuine concern, respect, and affection for each and every member of the family.

1:124 in *D'var Tzvi*; R. Shimon (Eiger) Sofer, *Responsa Hitor'rut Teshuvah*, vol. 3, *He'arot to Shulchan Arukh* 608; R. Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer, *Responsa K'tav Sofer, Even HaEzer* 47; R. Shlomo Fisher, *Beit Yishai* 10; R. Avraham David Horowitz, *Responsa Kinyan Torah B'Halakhah* 5:59; R. Avraham Erlanger, *Birkat Avraham, Beitzah*, p. 93, and *Bava Metzia*, p. 161; R. Yosef Roth, *Siach Yosef* 12; R. Yochanan Segal Vosner, *Responsa Chayyei HaLevi* 1:95:5; R. Ya'akov Traube, *Responsa Avnei Ya'akov* 206; R. Yehudah Polatchek, *Responsa Megeed Yehudah* 36; R. Yosef Sharbit, *Responsa Orchot Yosher, Choshen Mishpat* 1; R. Menashe Silber, *Responsa Moznai Tzedek* 28; R. Chaim Sofer, *Responsa Machaneh Chaim* 2:21; R. Moshe Dov Wolner, *Responsa Chemdat Tzvi* 2:81; R. Avraham Binyamin Silverberg, *Responsa Maharab* 47; *Responsa Beit Shearim* 181; R. Ezra Basri, *Responsa Sha'arei Ezra* 103 and 128; R. Leib Baron, *Responsa Yismach Chaim* 31; *Responsa Binyan Av* 3:4:2; R. Dov Eliezerov, *Responsa Shoeli Tziyyon* 1:5; R. Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, *Responsa Salmat Chaim* 816–819; *Responsa Shraga HaMeir* 6:94 and 8:63:1; R. Baruch Rakovsky, *Birkat Avot* 25; *Responsa Sha'arei Torah* 6; R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, *Responsa Bnai Banim* 2:27; and R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson, *Responsa Admor MeChabad* 60 and 68. For book-length treatments of this topic, see R. Yoel Schwartz, *Hokheach Tokheach*, and R. Hillel David Litwack, *Mitzvat HaTokhachah*.

100. This position is most well-known as that of the *Chazon Ish*, R. Avraham Yeshayah Karelitz, and it exists in whole or in part in the writings of the aforementioned authorities, as well as those of R. Yaakov Etlinger, R. Akiva Eiger, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. Sh'ar Yashuv Cohen, R. Shmuel Vosner, R. Avraham Tovolsky, R. Joseph D. Epstein, R. Moshe Tzuriel, R. Ephraim Moshe Korngut, and many others. For a more complete listing, see Introduction, pp. xxvii–xxviii, footnotes 87–89.

101. *Meshekh Chokhmah, Deuteronomy* 22:4.

